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Abstract
Part I of this Article considers the role played by the preliminary ruling procedure in the
context of the Community legal system as a whole. Part II discusses the types of questions that
may be appropriately referred to the Court for preliminary ruling. Part III examines the various
tribunals and courts that may make a reference to the Court of Justice. Part IV analyzes the tension
in the relationship between the Court and the national courts of the Member States. Finally, Part
V considers the legal effects of preliminary rulings.
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INTRODUCTION
The judicial function in the Community is divided be-
tween the national courts of the Member States and the Court
ofJustice (Court).' A national court has complete control over
the proceedings pending before it and alone has jurisdiction to
hand down the decision in those proceedings. It may be re-
quired to review questions of Community law relevant to the
dispute. If in so doing it encounters difficulties, it may-and,
in certain cases, it must-ask the Court for the necessary gui-
dance to resolve such difficulties. The preliminary ruling pro-
cedure under Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome' (EEC Treaty
* Chief Law Clerk, Court of Justice of the European Communities. All com-
ments made in this Article are personal.
This Article draws heavily upon the observations made in the author's book, DAS
VORABENTSCHEIDUNGSVERFAHREN NACH ARTIKEL 177 EWG-VERTRAc-EIN LEITFADEN
FOR DIE PRAXIS (1985).
1. The drafters of the Treaties establishing the European Communities decided
to entrust the task of ensuring that "in the interpretation and application of this
Treaty the Law is observed" to an independent judicial body, the Court of Justice.
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, art. 164, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 55 (Cmd. 5179-II) (official English transl.), 298 U.N.T.S.
11 (1958) (unofficial transl.) [hereinafter EEC Treaty]; Treaty instituting the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), art. 31, Apr. 18, 1951, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 1, at 29 (Cmd. 5189), 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty]; Treaty estab-
lishing the European Atomic Energy Commission (EAEC), art. 136, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. 201 (Cmd. 5179-II), 298 U.N.T.S. 167. By that decision, they
made the concepts and principles of Community law justiciable, and at the same
time, acknowledged that Community law constituted the foundation on which the
economic and political unity of Europe was to be constructed.
In other words, the European Community was intended by its founders to be not
merely an economic and social Community, not only a political organization based
on the common history of European peoples, but also a legal Community which pur-
sues its broad aims of integration within its own legal order. Thus economic and
political activity, the dynamism of which was fully recognized, was brought under
legal control and made subject to legislative objectives.
2. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177. Article 177 provides:
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or Treaty) provides the mechanism for so doing. Under Arti-
cle 177, the Court provides an interpretation of the Commu-
nity law in question that is at once related to the facts and ab-
stract. A national court must then apply the law to the facts
established by it in light of the Community law as interpreted
by the Court.
The procedure under Article 177 is intended to coordi-
nate the decisions of the national courts in the sphere of Com-
munity law. It is above all a means of ensuring the uniformity
of Community law. Additionally, as an intermediate procedure
in the proceedings pending before the national court, it has
evolved into an important guarantee of individual rights in the
Community.
Since the early days of the Court, the preliminary ruling
procedure has been a crucial element in its work. Although
originally conceived as playing a relatively minor role, in the
course of time the preliminary ruling procedure has become
increasingly dominant. It has developed into a pillar of the
Community legal order. One major reason for this is that the
respective national laws and Community law increasingly influ-
ence and interact with each other and that economic and social
activity in the Member States has been increasingly drawn into
the Community field of action. It is characteristic of this devel-
opment that the most important legal decisions of the Court
have been given in preliminary ruling proceedings. For exam-
ple, the "major" judgments on direct applicability and on the
supremacy of Community law or the leading decisions in the
area of the free movement of goods and persons have been
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community;
(c) the interpretations of the statutes of bodies established by an act of
the Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Mem-
ber State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a Member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial rem-
edy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before
the Court ofJustice.
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preliminary rulings. The influence of those judgments as a
creative force and the precedents they set have contributed de-
cisively to the building of a coherent Community legal order
with its own structure and principles.3
In this Article, I will attempt to show that notwithstanding
all the alleged and actual imperfections and inadequacies, the
preliminary ruling procedure has proved itself. Its effective-
ness and importance for the legal process have exceeded the
most ambitious expectations of the drafters of the Treaty. It is
idle to speculate upon hypothetical developments. Through-
out this Article, however, I have suggested that without the
procedure, Community law would not exist in its present form
as the uniformly applicable and supreme jus commune of the
Member States.
The Court's handling of questions referred to it some-
times arouses criticism and indignation among the national
courts. Thus, the Court has been accused of taking too many
liberties in construing or interpreting the questions referred to
it and of thus ignoring the real problem and its relationship to
the specific facts. Moreover, on occasion the impression is
given that-contrary to the formal assurance that the national
court bears responsibility for the judgment to be given in the
case'-the Court is in reality not content to provide the na-
tional court with the legal ruling sought but also wishes to en-
sure the application of its decision to the dispute in the main
proceedings.
Insofar as shortcomings exist in the cooperation between
the national courts and the Court of Justice-particularly re-
garding the submission of the reference and compliance with
3. The important role of the procedure is reflected in the statistics. A compari-
son of the number of references and direct actions that have been brought before the
Court--excluding staff cases and applications for the adoption of interim measures-
shows that approximately half the proceedings (1444 out of a total of 3016 cases in
the period from 1953 to 1985) were preliminary ruling proceedings. If those figures
are broken down, it becomes clear that the procedure was used sparingly in the
1960's (the first reference was made in 1961) but that afterwards, particularly since
the middle of the 1970's, references to the Court have considerably increased. In
1985, 139 requests for preliminary rulings were registered (as opposed to 229 direct
actions excluding staff cases and applications for the adoption of interim measures).
4. See Case 53/79, ONPTS v. Damiani, 1980 E.C.R. 273, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) -; Pigs Mktg. Bd. v. Redmond, Case 83/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2347, 2368,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8559.
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the preliminary ruling-they appear to be technical rather than
based on principle. Problems of principle arise only in excep-
tional cases. It may be argued, however, that these difficulties
are, as a rule, more imagined than real. Thus, although in
many cases there is still considerable reluctance among the na-
tional courts to use the procedure, the reservations appear to
be rooted in an insufficient knowledge or erroneous under-
standing of the mechanism of judicial cooperation.
Part I of this Article considers the role played by the pre-
liminary ruling procedure in the context of the Community
legal system as a whole. Part II discusses the types of ques-
tions that may be appropriately referred to the Court for pre-
liminary ruling. Part III examines the various tribunals and
courts that may make a reference to the Court of Justice. Part
IV analyzes the tension in the relationship between the Court
and the national courts of the Member States. Finally, Part V
considers the legal effects of preliminary rulings.
I. THE PRELIMINARY RULING PROCEDURE IN THE
COMMUNITY LEGAL SYSTEM
The Treaties of the European Communities list exhaus-
tively the proceedings that may come before the Court. Its ju-
risdiction is ratione materiae (competence d'attribution). Aside
from the opinions concerning the external affairs of the Com-
munity,5 the proceedings may be divided into two main
groups: direct actions and preliminary rulings.
In direct actions, proceedings are brought by an applicant
against a defendant. Thus, for example, the Commission or a
Member State may bring an action before the Court against a
Member State for infringement of the Treaty.6 Proceedings
may also be instituted for the annulment of a binding act of the
Council or the Commission 7 or for failure to act in respect of a
specific area of activity of the Council or the Commission.8
The action for damages9 allows for claims arising out of the
Community's noncontractual liability. In competition cases,
5. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 228(1).
6. Id. arts. 169, 170.
7. Id. arts. 173, 174.
8. Id. art. 175.
9. Id. art. 178.
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undertakings can bring actions against the decisions of the
Commission in its capacity as the European cartel authority.' 0
Finally, the Court settles disputes between Community officials
and their appointing authority."
There are major differences between those proceedings
and preliminary ruling proceedings with regard to both the
rules governing those proceedings and their function in the
Community system of legal protection. The preliminary ruling
procedure is not an independent procedure but merely a stage
in the proceedings pending before the national court, in which
the Court gives a "preliminary" ruling on certain questions
which have arisen in the main proceedings. Ordinary concepts
of adversarial procedure, such as standing and admissibility,
the merits of an action, the rules of evidence, and res judicata
are not relevant.
Under the Treaties, individuals are in principle not enti-
tled to bring actions directly challenging the legislative meas-
ures of the Community institutions before the Court. They
must institute proceedings in the national courts against imple-
menting measures adopted by the national authorities. It is
therefore all the more important to enable the national court
to ask the Court to provide it with guidance in making its deci-
sion with regard to questions of Community law. Thus the
Court of Justice is able at the same time to review the validity
of a Community rule which has been challenged by individuals
who may not themselves bring an action to have that measure
declared void. In that respect the procedure under Article 177
fulfills the same function in the system of legal protection as an
action for a declaration of nullity. At least to some extent it
cancels out the restrictions which Article 173 of the EEC
Treaty imposes on the right to bring an action.' 2
The preliminary ruling procedure shares certain common
features with appeal proceedings. In addition to a function of
10. Id. art. 172.
11. Id. art. 179.
12. N.V. Internationale Crediet - en Handelsvereniging 'Rotterdam' & De
Co6peratieve Suikerfabriek en Raffinaderij G.A. Puttershoek v. Minister van
Landbouw en Visserij (Netherlands Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries) (two refer-
ences for a preliminary ruling by the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijsleven),
Joined Cases 73 & 74/63, 1964 E.C.R. 1, 22, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) - (opinion
of Advocate General Roemer).
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legal protection, it fulfills an important function of coordina-
tion. It differs from appeal proceedings, however, inasmuch as
it is not intended to correct previously adopted decisions, but
to provide national courts, before they deliver their judgments,
with useful indications as to the substance of the applicable
Community law. Consequently, the procedure is not based on
the principle of a jucicial hierarchy with lower and higher
courts but on the principle of the coordination of the activity of
courts of equal standing in pursuit of their common task: to
ensure that Community law is observed in every area of soci-
ety. 3
The power of the Court to implement Community law is
limited. Such implementation is generally a matter for the
Member States (indirect implementation), unless the Treaties
or secondary Community legislation provide for implementa-
tion by the Community institutions themselves (direct imple-
mentation). Apart from the internal regulations for the Com-
munity institutions and their staff, there are few examples of
direct implementation.' 4  The vast majority of Community
legislation is implemented by the authorities of the Member
States.15
Because the implementing measures of national adminis-
trations must be challenged under national law, matters of
Community law come before the national courts and are within
their jurisdiction. In principle, they are free to interpret and
apply the relevant Community law as independent courts. 16 In
13. The preliminary ruling procedure cannot, however, be compared to an advi-
sory opinion, which serves as a preventive review of legality. It does not clarify hypo-
thetical legal questions, but provides the national court with assistance in making its
decision in a specific case pending before it. See infra text accompanying note 64.
14. They include competition law, EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 85-91, the
rules on State aids, id., art. 92-94, and the rules on steel quotas, ECSC Treaty, supra
note 1, art. 58.
15. Examples are the Common Customs Tariff, the complex rules governing the
agricultural markets (levies and refunds, the collection and payment of monetary
compensatory amounts and so on) or the rules on the free movement of persons
(including social security law, the right of establishment and the freedom to provide
services).
16. Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG & Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer ftir
das Saarland, Case 33/76, 1976 E.C.R. 1989, 1997, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8382.
"Applying the principle of co-operation laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty, it is the
national courts which are entrusted with ensuring the legal protection which citizens
derive from the direct effect of the provisions of Community law." Id. para. 5.
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other words the national court is the "ordinary" court of Com-
munity law with respect to all directly applicable rules of Com-
munity law.
In view of the fact that both the Court and the national
courts are required to interpret and apply Community law, it is
immediately clear that the decisions given would not be consis-
tent without a central court to provide a uniform interpreta-
tion. Differences in legal methods and divergent legal con-
cepts in the individual Member States could lead to differing
views as to the relevance of directly applicable Community leg-
islation and, in certain circumstances, as to the substance of
the Community law held to be relevant. Differences can occur
particularly where the scope and intention of national law are
different from that of Community law, or where the expres-
sions used in the various official languages have different
meanings.
In national judicial systems, the uniformity of the law is
ensured by the hierarchical structure of the courts. 17 Funda-
mental considerations of legal policy make that solution im-
possible in the Community sphere. The European Community
was conceived as-and is, in its present stage of develop-
ment-an entity which is not intended to resemble a State.
Rather, it is a union of States founded upon the transfer of
sovereign rights in limited areas. In such an organization it
would not be possible to develop a judicial structure resem-
bling that of the national legal orders.
Article 177, therefore, represents a compromise that con-
siders the special features of the relationship between the
Community legal order and the national legal orders of the
Member States. It does not turn the Court into a European
appeals court or court of cassation. Rather, it institutionalizes
the requisite coordination and cooperation between that Court
and the national courts by assigning to the Court the task of
clarifying in advance in intermediate proceedings questions of
Community law which the national courts consider relevant to
their decision. It does not establish a hierarchical relationship
between the national courts and the Court of Justice.
17. Cf C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 1-21 (4th ed. 1983) (discussion
of federal judicial system in the United States).
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II. QUESTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY RULINGS
Article 177 limits the field of application of the prelimi-
nary ruling procedure strictly to rules of Community law so
that national law as such can never be the subject of a prelimi-
nary ruling. The Court may neither interpret national law nor
consider whether it is valid or applicable. In that respect the
Court has repeatedly emphasized that under Article 177 it has
no jurisdiction to interpret or review legal measures and provi-
sions of national law,' 8 much less assess the facts established
by the national court. 9
A. Measures Subject to Review
The first paragraph of Article 177 expressly distinguishes
between two types of questions that may be referred to the
Court: questions of validity, i.e., the existence of Community
law, and questions of interpretation, i.e., the context of Com-
munity law. The latter category can relate to the Treaty, the
acts of the institutions of the Community, and the statutes of
bodies established by an act of the Council. On the other
hand, questions concerning validity can relate only to the acts
of the institutions of the Community. However, both types of
questions pursue the same fundamental aim: the review of
Community rules in light of the requirements and the specific
aims of the Community legal order. Thus, a national court is
provided with the means of applying Community law correctly
in the proceedings pending before it.20
By "Treaty," the drafters of Article 177 implied not only
the treaty provisions but also the annexes, amendments, and
Treaties of Accession of the Member States. The "acts of the
institutions" of the Community, on the other hand, represent
18. E.g., Fonderie Officine Riunite (FOR) v. Vereinigte Kammgarn - Spinner-
eien (VKS), Case 54/72, 1973 E.C.R. 193, 205, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8208;
Carmine Capolongo v. Azienda Agricola Maya, Case 77/72, 1973 E.C.R. 611, 622,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8213.
19. Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. Onno Klopp, Case 107/83, 1984
E.C.R. 2971, 2988, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,116 (reference for preliminary
ruling from the French Cour de Cassation); Mr. & Mrs. F. v. Belgian State, Case
7/75, 1975 E.C.R. 679, 689, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4656.536 (preliminary ruling
requested by the Tribunal du Travail de Nivelles).
20. Demag AG v. Finanzamt Duisburg - Siid, Case 27/74, 1974 E.C.R. 1037,
1046, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8288 (preliminary ruling requested by the
Finanzgericht Diusseldorf).
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"secondary" Community law, or those legal measures-other
than merely internal measures-adopted by the institutions
and other bodies of the Community. That law includes the
measures set forth in Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, namely
regulations, directives and decisions. Recommendations and
opinions are not legally binding and, as such, are not covered
by Article 177. Their interpretation may, however, become
relevant in connection with other provisions, such as the duty
to respect the objectives of the Community under Article 5 of
the EEC Treaty.
Secondary Community law also includes international
treaties that are concluded by the Community with nonmem-
ber countries or international organizations. According to an
established principle laid down by the Court they form "an in-
tegral part of Community law."'' 2 The same holds true for
agreements, such as the General Agreements on Tariffs and
Trade,22 which were concluded by the Member States, but
whose terms now fall within the competence of the Commu-
nity. Such agreements are treated in the same way as agree-
ments concluded by the Community itself, and therefore form
part of Community law, because the Community has taken
over from the Member States the obligations arising out of
those agreements.23
Like international law and the legal orders of most Mem-
ber States, the Community legal order is not limited only to
the rules of positive law, but also embraces general principles,
including especially, fundamental human rights. The Court
21. R. & V. Haegeman v. Belgian State, Case 181/73, 1974 E.C.R. 449, 460,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8273 (preliminary ruling requested by Tribunal de pre-
miere instance de Bruxelles); see also Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg et
Cie.KG a.A., Case 104/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3641, 3662, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8877
(reference for preliminary ruling from Bundesfinanzhof).
22. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, A7, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
23. Societi Italiana per l'Oleodotto Transalpino (SIOT) v. Ministero della Ma-
rina Mercantile, Circoscrizione doganale di Trieste & Ente Autonomo del Portodi
Trieste, Case 266/81, 1983 E.C.R. 731, 780, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,001 (ref-
erence for preliminary ruling from the Corte Suprema di Cassazione); Douaneagent
der NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen v. Inspecteur der invoerrechten en accijnzen, Case
38/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1439, 1450, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8327 (preliminary ruling
requested by Tarief commissie); International Fruit Co. v. Produktschep Voor
Groenten en Fruit, Joined Cases 21-24/72, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 1228, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8194.
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has consistently recognized that such principles form an inte-
gral part of Community law and are to be taken into considera-
tion by it in reaching its decisions.24 The Court has developed
that position from the legal policy which is expressed in the
requirement, to which I have already referred, that the Court
of Justice ensure that in the interpretation and application of
the Treaties "the law is observed." It follows that questions
concerning the existence or the content of unwritten principles
may be referred to the Court.
A preliminary ruling may not concern the compatibility of
national law with Community law, which must take prece-
dence. However, the Court generally construes such questions
to mean that the national court is "essentially" seeking criteria
for the interpretation of the relevant Community law so that it
can itself rule on compatibility.25 Accordingly, it has always
striven to provide the national court with an interpretation of
Community law that corresponds to the particular features of
the main proceedings, and on which the national court can rely
in applying national law in accordance with the requirements
of the Community legal order.
B. Validity and Interpretation
As I have already discussed, Article 177 of the Treaty dis-
tinguishes between the review of validity and interpretation.
While all Community law irrespective of its legislative status
and hierarchical rank can be the object of a request for inter-
pretation, only "the acts of the institutions of the Community"
within the meaning of subparagraph (b) of the first paragraph
24. Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, 1979 E.C.R. 3727,
3744-45, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8629 (preliminary ruling requested by the
Verwaltungsgericht Neustadt);J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgross-handlung v. Com-
mission, Case 4/73, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 507, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 162.51; Inter-
nationale Handels GmbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle ftir Getreide und Futtermit-
tel, Case 11/70, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1134, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8126 (reference
for preliminary ruling by Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt); Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozi-
alamt, Case 29/69, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 425, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8077.
25. Minist~re Public v. Xavier Mirepoix, Case 54/85, 1986 E.C.R. -, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,320 (interpretation of Article 30 to determine whether na-
tional legislation prohibiting the use of a pesticide is compatible with Community
law); Minist~re Public of Luxembourg v. Madeleine Hein, n~e Muller, Case 10/71,
1971 E.C.R. 723, 729, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8140 (reference for preliminary
ruling by Tribunal d'arrondissement of Luxembourg).
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of Article 177 can be the subject of a preliminary ruling review-
ing their validity.
Validity corresponds to legality.26 However, it is striking
that the Treaty refers to legality in connection with actions for
a declaration of nullity under Article 173 of the Treaty, but
not, however, in relation to the preliminary ruling procedure.
There are in fact clear functional differences between an action
under Article 173 and the review of validity in a preliminary
ruling procedure. Such differences are related to the different
objectives of the procedures. In contrast to an action under
Article 173, a preliminary ruling procedure is not intended pri-
marily as a means of reviewing specific acts of the Community
institutions, but rather as a means of informing the national
court of the state of applicable law. Those different aims are
clearly reflected in the fact that a request for a review of valid-
ity in preliminary ruling proceedings is not restricted by a time
limit and is subject to no restrictions regarding the persons en-
titled to bring an action.
Interpretation is, in accordance with normal linguistic us-
age, the ascertaining of the content and the importance of a
specific rule. That includes the question of the duration of the
validity of the measure in question. The fact that the provi-
sions of Community law are published in several languages
means that all relevant versions in the different official lan-
guages (nine at present) are to be compared on an equal ba-
SS27sis. 7
26. See, e.g., Westzucker GmbH v. Einfuhr - und Vorratsstelle fuir Zucker, Case
57/72, 1973 E.C.R. 321, 336, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8211 (preliminary ruling
requested by the Verwaltungsgerichtshof Hessen) (in which the Court referred to the
"legality of that measure" in reviewing the validity of a Commission Regulation); see
also Deuka, Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH BJ. Stolp v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fir
Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 78/74, 1975 E.C.R. 421, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8302; Deuka, Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH BJ. Stolp v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle flir
Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 5/75, 1975 E.C.R. 759, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8313 (preliminary rulings requested by the Verwaltungsgerichtshof and the Verwal-
tungsgericht Frankfurt, respectively); Internationale Handel GmbH, Case 11/70, 1970
E.C.R. 1125, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8126.
27. E.g., Knud Wendelboe, Forening af Arbejdsledere i Danmark (Ass'n of Su-
pervisory Staff, Denmark), Handels-og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i Danmark
(Union of Commercial & Clerical Employees) v. LJ. Music ApS, Case 19/83, 1985
E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,179 (para. 13 of the judgment); H.B.M.
Abels v. The Administrative Board of the BedrijfsVereniging voor de Metaalindustrie
en de Electrotechnische Industrie (Professional & Trade Ass'n for the Metal & Elec-
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The Court has attached great importance to a schematic
and teleological interpretation based on the aims of the Treaty
and the principle of the effectiveness (effet utile) of Community
rules.28 That interpretative method has had a profound effect.
Thus, in particular, the Court has been able to develop the law
creatively by filling lacunae (gaps). The method consists es-
sentially in relying on general principles and actions of law to
determine the meaning of, in particular, obscure legal con-
cepts. At the same time, the Court has inferred from the prin-
ciple of a unified Community legal order that its individual
provisions are to be interpreted, as far as possible, so as to
avoid conflict with other Community law provisions.
A characteristic feature of the Court's interpretative meth-
odology is the development of a scheme of rules and excep-
tions. In other words, it applies the maxim that the fundamen-
tal principles of the Common Market and, in particular, the ba-
sic freedoms provided for in the EEC Treaty (e.g., movement
of goods, movement of persons, freedom to provide services
and free movement of capital) are to be interpreted broadly,
while exceptions to and restrictions on those freedoms are to
be interpreted strictly.29 That rule represents a clear reversal
of the traditional precept of international law stating that
clauses in international treaties which restrict States' freedom
trotechnical Industries), Case 135/83, 1985 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,176; Stauder, Case 29/69, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 424, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8077.
28. See, e.g., D.M. Levin v. Staatssecretaris vanjustitie, Case 53/81, 1982 E.C.R.
1035, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8821 (reference for preliminary ruling from the
Netherlands Raad van State) (right of residence); Gabrielle Defrenne v. Soci~t6
Anonyme Beige de Navigation Adrienne Sabena, Case 43/75, 1976 E.C.R. 455,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8346 (preliminary ruling requested by the Cour du travail
Brussels) (equal pay for men and women); Commission v. Council, Case 22/70, 1971
E.C.R. 263, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8134 (power of the Community in external
relations); N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v.
Nederlandse administratie der belastingen (Netherlands Inland Revenue Administra-
tion), Case 26/62, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 24, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8008 (the question
of direct applicability).
29. See, e.g., Simmenthal SpA v. Italian Minister for Finance, Case 35/76, 1976
E.C.R. 1871, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8388 (preliminary ruling requested by the
Pretore of Susa); Roland Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, Case 36/75, 1975 E.C.R.
1219, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8322 (preliminary ruling requested by the Tribunal
administratif Paris); Yvonne van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, 1974 E.C.R.
1337, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8283 (preliminary ruling requested by the Chan-
cery Division of the High Court ofJustice); Commission v. Government of the Italian
Republic, Case 7/61, 1961 E.C.R. 317, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8001.
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of action are to be interpreted restrictively. By a varied and
systematic application of that rule, the Court has been able, in
the conflict between the requirements of the Community Trea-
ties and the restrictive effects of national politics, to give prece-
dence to the former.
Interpretation is to be distinguished from the application
of Community law, as interpreted by the Court, to the estab-
lished facts. Under the preliminary ruling procedure, the ap-
plication of Community law is the sole responsibility of the na-
tional court. That is clear both from the wording of Article
177, which-in contrast to Article 164-refers merely to the
interpretation and not to the application of Community law,
and from the function of the preliminary ruling procedure,
which is based on a strict division of duties between the na-
tional court and the Court ofJustice. Thus the Court has re-
peatedly stated that in preliminary ruling proceedings it has no
jurisdiction to decide the main proceedings. It cannot rule on
the application of the Community law in question to the spe-
cific case. °
That may sometimes lead to practical difficulties, since the
Court's interpretation can provide real assistance in the deci-
sionmaking process of the national court only if it is sufficiently
related to the particular features of the specific case. In that
context the Court must take into account two opposing re-
quirements. It must provide a sufficiently clear legal opinion
that can be directly applied to the case in question, while
avoiding at all costs anything that could be regarded as inter-
ference with the national court's prerogative of deciding the
dispute before it. It must be particularly careful in cases in
which not all the facts are available or where the national court
has a certain discretion.3'
30. Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. 585, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8023 (request for a preliminary ruling by the Giudice Conciliatore di Mi-
lano); Da Costa en Schaake N.V., Jacob Meijer N.V. & Hoechst - Holland N.V. v.
Nederlandse Belastingadministratie,Joined Cases 28-30/62, 1963 E.C.R. 31, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8010 (reference for preliminary ruling by the Tariefcommissie).
31. See, e.g., Coditel S.A. Compagnie G~nrale pour la Diffusion de la T6lvision
v. Cin6 - Vog Films SA, Case 262/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3381, 3402, para. 18, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8865 (reference for preliminary ruling from Cour de Cassation of the
Kingdom of Belgium); Criminal Proceedings against Timothy Frederick Robertson,
Case 220/81, 1982 E.C.R. 2349, 2361, para. 13, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8851
(reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de Premiere Instance, Brus-
ARTICLE 177 EEC TREATY
III. THE NATIONAL COURTS
With respect to the bodies qualified to make a reference to
the Court, Article 177 establishes in the first place an institu-
tional definition, i.e. that any body of a Member State which
possesses the status of a court or tribunal may make a refer-
ence to the Court. However, the above definition must be
qualified by a functional element, because a reference is only
admissible when it is made in connection with the judicial ac-
tivity of the court or tribunal.
A. The Institutional Definition
A request for a preliminary ruling may only be made by a
court or tribunal of a Member State."'3 2 The expression
"court or tribunal" would present no difficulties if it meant any
body which is described as a court or tribunal under national
law. However, a definition by reference to the legal order of
the Member States would be unsatisfactory. Indeed, Article
177 envisions an independent Community law concept, to be
defined by a comparison of the various legal orders of the
Member States in accordance with the aims and the purpose of
the preliminary ruling procedure.33
To qualify as a court or tribunal, a body's title is not im-
portant. Rather, its function and position in the relevant sys-
tem of legal protection are the determining factors. If that
were not the case, whole sectors of economic and social activity
might be entirely or at least partially removed from the control
of the Court. In that way, the aim, importance, and effect of
the preliminary ruling procedure would be compromised.
In accordance with a principle common to all the Member
States, a court or tribunal must be an independent body, i.e., it
must have jurisdiction to decide disputes and must not be sub-
ject to instructions. The Court has adopted that principle by
implication in a number of preliminary rulings. For instance, it
has answered questions referred by the Italian "Pretore," a
sels); Criminal Proceedings against Anton Adriaan Fietje, Case 27/80, 1980 E.C.R.
3839, 3854, para. 12, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8721 (preliminary ruling requested
by the Arrondissementsrechtbank Assen).
32. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177, paras. 2, 3.
33. J. BOULOUIS & R.-M. CHEVALLIER, 1 GRANDS ARRETS DE LA COUR DE JUSTICE
DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENES 136-37 (1978).
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kind of justice of the peace. Similarly, it has recognized that
the following bodies are entitled to refer to it for a preliminary
ruling: the Centrale Raad van Beroep, the College van Beroep
voor het Bedrijfsleven and the Tariefcommissie (Netherlands),
the National Insurance Commissioner (United Kingdom), s4
and the Conseil d'Etat or Raad van State (Belgium, France,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands).
Indications as to what is meant by "court or tribunal"
under Article 177 may be found in the judgment in Vaassen-
G6bbels,35 which concerned a request for a preliminary ruling
by the Scheidsgerecht van het Beambtenfonds voor het
Mijnbedrijf.36 The Court accepted the request because the tri-
bunal was properly constituted under Netherlands law, it was a
permanent body charged with the settlement of disputes de-
fined in general terms in provisions that corresponded to those
applying to ordinary courts. Moreover, its jurisdiction was
compulsory and it was bound to apply rules of law. Thus, it
was a "court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 177"
and as such was entitled to refer to the Court for a preliminary
ruling.
Consequently, a court or tribunal within the meaning of
Article 177 has the following procedural and substantive at-
tributes: independence of the deciding body; a statutory basis,
i.e., it must be a public body of the Member State concerned;
its permanent character; its compulsory jurisdiction; the adver-
sarial nature of the proceedings before it; the fact that it must
apply rules of law.
It follows from the grounds of the judgment in Vaassen-
G6bbels, a contrario, that purely private arbitration tribunals are
not entitled to refer to the Court, particularly when they do not
apply objective law, but decide disputes ex aequo et bono. The
Court reached that conclusion expressly in a more recent deci-
sion, Nordsee,3 7 which concerned a German arbitration tribunal.
34. This is now the Social Security Commissioner.
35. G. Vaassen (n& G6bbels) Management of the Beambtenfonds voor bet
Mijnbedrijf, Case 61/65, 1966 E.C.R. 261, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8050 (refer-
ence for a preliminary ruling by the Scheidsgerecht van bet Beambtenfonds voor het
Mijnbedrijf, Heerlen).
36. This is the Arbitration Tribunal of the fund for non-manual workers em-
ployed in the mining industry.
37. Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseefisch-
erei Nordstern AG & Co. KG & Reederei Friedrich, Case 102/81, 1982 E.C.R. 1095,
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The Court held that the tribunal in question had certain fea-
tures of a genuine court, i.e., that the arbitration proceedings
were conducted within the framework of the law, that the arbi-
trator had to decide according to the the law and his award
had, as between the parties, the force of resjudicata and would
be enforceable if leave to issue execution were obtained. How-
ever, those considerations were not sufficient to give the arbi-
tration tribunal the status of a "court or tribunal" within the
meaning of Article 177. That was so because the parties in the
main proceedings were free to specify in their contract whether
they wished to use the arbitration procedure or to rely on the
competent State courts to settle the dispute. Consequently,
the German public authorities had not delegated to the arbitra-
tion tribunal the duty of ensuring compliance with the obliga-
tions arising under Community law.
This decision appears to be of considerable practical im-
portance, because there is an increasing tendency in the Mem-
ber States to resort to private arbitration tribunals to settle dis-
putes relating to private law and, particularly, economic law.
However, it must be added that the judgment emphasizes the
particular features of the specific arbitration procedure in
question and therefore does not necessarily mean that refer-
ences may not be made by arbitration tribunals in procedures
conducted under different rules.
Moreover, the grounds of the judgment expressly stated
that references from State courts or tribunals related to arbi-
tration proceedings are admissible. That means that national
courts are entirely free to refer to the Court, if they consider it
necessary, in connection with the assistance they must provide
to arbitration tribunals in certain cases, or in relation to any
review of the arbitration decision which they may be called
upon to carry out. Therefore, unsatisfactory consequences
arising from the fact that private arbitration tribunals may not
make a reference to the Court may to some extent be cor-
rected, inasmuch as the national courts may refer to the Court
in connection with their participation in the adoption of an ar-
bitration decision or the enforcement of that decision.
The judgment in Nordsee has, not surprisingly, produced
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8822 (request for preliminary ruling from Walther
Richter, Pres. of Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Bremen, arbitrator).
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lively reactions. Certain commentators regret that the Court
of Justice does not ensure unreservedly the uniform applica-
tion of Community law in the increasingly important area of
contractual arbitration. The majority, however, note with ap-
proval that the judgment places limits on the possibility of ma-
nipulation of the preliminary ruling procedure by private per-
sons.
Questions of definition arise in particular with respect to
professional bodies. In the first place, the Court has adopted
as criteria the extent of State participation and the degree to
which a State guarantees the independence of the body making
the decision and confers legal effect on its decisions. In
Broekmeulen, it found that the Dutch appeals committee for gen-
eral medicine satisfied those requirements. 8 On the other
hand, in Borker, it took the view that the Conseil de L'Ordre
des Avocats did not possess the requisite attributes since it was
empowered only to deliver an opinion and not to decide
cases.
39
B. The Functional Definition
A reference may be made to the Court only when the na-
tional court considers a decision necessary to enable it "to give
judgment." Hence, a reference may not be made by a court
which, although qualified under Article 177, is acting in the
specific case as an administrative authority rather than a judi-
cial body. Thus, for example, where it is acting as an ap-
pointing authority or when it adopts an administrative mea-
sure, Article 177 does not apply. Measures of that type, which
do not concern judicial activity, do not represent judicial deci-
sions within the meaning of Article 177.
Initially, various commentators raised the question
whether certain summary proceedings were compatible with a
reference for a preliminary ruling in view of the speed with
which they must be completed.4" In light of the Court's deci-
38. C. Broekmeulen v. Huisarts Registratie Commissie, Case 246/80, 1981
E.C.R. 2311, 2328, para. 17, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8773 (reference for a prelim-
inary ruling from the Commissie van Beroep Huisartsgeneeskunde, The Hague).
39. Jules Borker, Case 138/80, 1980 E.C.R. 1975, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8705 (preliminary ruling requested by the Conseil de l'Ordre des Avocats i la Cour
de Paris).
40. The type of proceedings in which the question to be submitted arises is, on the
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sions, the answer is clearly affirmative. In a number of judg-
ments, the Court has both explicitly and implicitly confirmed
that the urgency or the provisional character of such proceed-
ings cannot affect a court's right to make a reference to the
Court when its decision is based on Community law.4 1
Thus for example the judgments in Stauder,4 2 Deutsche
Grammophon43 and Polydor44 concerned requests for prelimi-
nary rulings in connection with proceedings arising out of an
interim order or injunction. Other judgments concerned ref-
erences from Italian courts in the pre-litigation stage of liqui-
dation proceedings or administrative proceedings.45 The
Court stated that "Article 177 does not make the reference to
the Court subject to whether the proceedings at the conclusion
of which the national court has drawn up the reference for a
preliminary ruling were or were not defended. '46 The same
applies for an inquiry conducted by an examining magistrate,
which inquiry under French law can precede the actual crimi-
other hand, not important, provided that the request for a preliminary ruling comes
from a national court which is sitting in its judicial capacity.
41. See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, Case 107/76, 1977 E.C.R. 957, 972, paras. 3-4,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8466 (preliminary ruling requested by the Ober-
landesgericht Karlsruhe); see also Elestina Esselina Christina Morson v. State of the
Netherlands & Head of the Plaatselijke Politie, Seuradjie Jhanjan v. Netherlands,
Joined Cases 35 and 36/82, 1982 E.C.R. 3723, 3734, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8876 (references from Hoge Raad der Nederlanden).
42. Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, Case 29/69, 1969 E.C.R. 419,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8077.
43. Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v. Metro-SB-Grossm~irkte GmbH & Co. KG,
Case 78/70, 1971 E.C.R. 487, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8106 (reference for a pre-
liminary ruling by the Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg).
44. Polydor Ltd. & RSO Records Inc. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd. & Simons
Records Ltd., Case 270/80, 1982 E.C.R. 329, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8806 (refer-
ence for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal of England and Wales).
45. E.g., Birra Dreher SpA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, Case
162/73, 1974 E.C.R. 201, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8264 (preliminary ruling re-
quested by the Pretore di Roma); Riseria Luigi Geddo v. Ente nazionale Risi, Case
2/73, 1973 E.C.R. 865, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8219 (preliminary ruling re-
quested by the Pretore di Milano); Politi S.A.S. v. Ministry for Finance of the Italian
Republic, Case 43/71, 1971 E.C.R. 1039, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8159 (reference
for a preliminary ruling by the President of the Tribunale di Torino); Eunoma di
Porro e C. v. Ministry of Education of the Italian Rep., Case 18/71, 1971 E.C.R. 811,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8148 (reference for a preliminary ruling by the Pres. of
the Tribunal di Torino); SpA SACE v. Ministry for Finance of the Italian Republic,
Case 33/70, 1970 E.C.R. 1213, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8117 (reference for a
preliminary ruling by the Tribunale, Brescia).
46. Birra Dreher, 1974 E.C.R. at 211, para. 3.
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nal proceedings.4 A reference in connection with an objec-
tion raised in nonadversarial proceedings (e.g., against an or-
der issued by the Registrar of companies) has likewise already
been the subject of a preliminary ruling.48
Moreover, it follows from the principle of the division of
jurisdiction between the national court and the Court ofJustice
that it is not for the Court to determine "whether the decision
whereby a matter is brought before it was taken in accordance
with the rules of national law governing the organization of the courts
and their procedure."' 49 Thus, in Reina, the Court dismissed the
objection that the Chamber of the German administrative
court to which the case had been assigned had made a refer-
ence to the Court without the participation of lay judges. This,
it was claimed, was contrary to German procedural rules. The
Court therefore considers a reference to have been properly
made even when the national court is not properly constituted
or when there has not been compliance with national provi-
sions in relation to the staying of the proceedings and the ref-
erence.
50
IV. THE RIGHT AND THE DUTY TO MAKE REFERENCES
According to the second paragraph of Article 177, any
court or tribunal of a Member State may make a reference to
the Court of Justice when it considers that a decision on a
question of the kind referred to in that article is "necessary to
enable it to give judgment." Under the third paragraph of Ar-
ticle 177, on the other hand, only certain national courts are
under a duty to refer questions to the Court, namely those
"against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under na-
tional law." These phrases call for some clarification.
47. Procureur de la R6publique v. Ren6 Chatain, Case 65/79, 1980 E.C.R. 1345,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8671 (preliminary ruling requested by the Tribunal de
Grande Instance, Nanterre).
48. Friedrich Haaga GmbH, Case 32/74, 1974 E.C.R. 1201, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8289 (preliminary ruling requested by the Bundesgerichtshof).
49. Francesco Reina & Letizia Reina v. Landeskreditbank Baden - Wilrttemberg,
Case 65/81, 1982 E.C.R. 33, 43, para. 7, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8790 (emphasis
supplied).
50. See id. at 43, para. 8.
ARTICLE 177 EEC TREATY
A. The Right to Make a Reference
1. The Power of Appraisal of the National Courts
Article 177 provides for direct cooperation between the
Court of Justice and the national courts by means of a
nonadversarial procedure. It follows from the cooperative na-
ture of this procedure that the decision whether or not to refer
a question to the Court is a matter solely for the court hearing
the case and not for the parties to the proceedings before it. It
is also for that court alone to determine the content of the
questions to be referred. The parties, or-where appropri-
ate-the State Prosecutor's Office, have no control over the re-
ferral of those questions or over their wording.51
The national court is therefore quite at liberty to make a
reference to the Court even if the parties make no such re-
quest, or, when necessary, even if contrary to their expressed
wish. Because this is a question of jurisdiction and thus falls
within the area of public policy, the national court must be able
to refer questions on its own motion. Furthermore, it would
be contrary to good sense to prohibit it from referring ques-
tions to the Court simply because the issue concerned escaped
the notice of the parties or because the parties wished to evade
the application of Community law.
In general, a national court hearing an action will only
make a reference to the Court if it has a "question," that is, if it
considers the ruling of the Court necessary for its own deci-
sion. The making of a reference thus presupposes the exist-
ence of a "real difficulty which would arouse doubt in the mind
of an open-minded observer."'52 In general, such doubt only
arises when the meaning and intent of a provision of Commu-
nity law are not clear from its wording and context, or if there
are real or apparent lacunae in the text. In that case the mean-
ing of the text must be determined by means of an interpreta-
tive ruling, and the gaps in the applicable law filled.
Justification for the making of a reference under the sec-
ond paragraph of Article 177 is to be found, however, not in
the existence of objective uncertainty or lacunae in a provision
51. Hessische Knappschaft v. Maison Singer et fils, Case 44/65, 1965 E.C.R.
965, 970, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8042 (reference for a preliminary ruling by the
Cour d'appel, Colmar).
52. 1 E. LAFFERRIERE, TRAITE DE JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE 449 (1887).
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of Community law but in the subjective view of the national
court.5 3 The important point is whether or not the national
court decides whether it can ascertain with sufficient accuracy
the existence and content of the rule of Community law in
question. National courts would therefore be well advised to
avoid setting the threshold of doubt too high and to make the
widest possible use of their right to make references, in order
to preclude any possibility of divergence between their juris-
prudence and that of the Court ofJustice. In this regard, due
attention must be given to the fact that Community regulations
are adopted in several languages, to the complexity of the sub-
ject matter, and to the technical and systematic characteristics
of Community law.
The principle of procedural economy requires that the na-
tional court only refer a question to the Court of Justice when
it is certain that the question is relevant to deciding the action
of which it is seised. Such a requirement also accords with the
principle of mutual confidence and cooperation.
The Court has consistently held that the relevance of the
question referred is a matter exclusively for the national court
hearing the action, which has a certain "power of appraisal" in
that regard. 54 Since it is responsible for the decision to be
taken and in the context of that decision must apply the rele-
vant Community law to the specific case in hand, it alone is in a
position to assess the necessity and relevance of the question
referred. The Court is barred from making any such assess-
ment, if for no other reason than that otherwise it would have
to delve extensively into questions of national law.
The Court of Justice has developed this principle particu-
larly clearly in recent cases. In the Damiani case,55 one of the
parties to the main proceedings argued that the question re-
ferred was "inopportune" in view of the various arguments re-
lied on before the national court. The Court rejected this ar-
gument in the following terms:
53. The conditions defining the extent of the duty to make a reference under the
third paragraph of Article 177 are different.
54. Pasquale Foglia v. Mariella Novello, Case 244/80, 1981 E.C.R. 3045, 3062,
para. 16, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8786 (Foglia v. Novello II).
55. Office National des Pensions pour Travailleurs Salaries (O.N.P.T.S.) v. Fi-
oravante Damiani, Case 53/79, 1980 E.C.R. 273, 281, para. 5, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) - (request for preliminary ruling by Belgian Cour de Cassation).
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It is not for this Court to pronounce on the expediency of
the request for a preliminary ruling. As regards the division
ofjurisdiction between national courts and the Court ofJus-
tice under Article 177 of the Treaty it is for the national
court, which is alone in having a direct knowledge of the
facts of the case and of the arguments put forward by the
parties, and which will have to give judgment in the case, to
appreciate, with full knowledge of the matter before it, the
relevance of the question of law raised by the dispute before
it and the necessity for a preliminary ruling so as to enable
it to give judgment.56
For the same reasons, it is irrelevant from the point of
view of Community law at what stage of the main proceedings
the reference is made. For reasons of procedural economy,
the national court should of course make the reference only at
a stage of the proceedings after the relevant facts have been
ascertained to a large extent and it is able properly to assess
the expediency of the question to be referred. Such considera-
tions are, however, a matter for the national court alone.
The national court's right to refer questions to the Court
of Justice regarding the validity and interpretation of Commu-
nity law is wide in scope and flows directly from the Treaty. As
such, it cannot be restricted by the national legislature. In that
regard Article 177 isjus cogens. The question of the scope of
the right to make a reference is not entirely free of difficulty,
however, because preliminary reference proceedings are
merely an interlocutory stage in the main proceedings before
the national court, the course of which is governed by the pro-
cedural rules of national law. A conflict of goals can arise in
particular between the right of a lower court to make a refer-
ence and the procedural principle that it is bound by the judg-
ments of a higher court. For example, such a conflict arises
when an appellate court quashes a decision of a lower court
and remits the matter to that court for judgment, and under
national procedural law the lower court is bound by the appel-
late court's finding of law. Such a situation gave rise to the two
56. Id. at 281, 282, para. 5; see also Ministre Public v. Asjes ("Nouvelles
Frontires"), Cases 209-213/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287
(reference for preliminary ruling from the Pretura, Bra); Foglia v. Novello H, Case
244/80, 1981 E.C.R. 3045, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8786.
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Rheinmtihlen Disseldorf cases,57 which concerned Paragraph
126(5) of the German Finanzgerichtsordnung-the Rules of
Procedure in the Finanzgerichte-under which the trial court
is bound by the legal ruling of the appellate court.
In those judgments, the Court emphasized the decisive
importance of Article 177 in preserving the unity of Commu-
nity law. That unity would be endangered if the lower court
could be prevented, because it is bound on points of law by the
rulings of the superior court from referring matters to the
Court for a preliminary ruling. The lower court must there-
fore be free-if it considers that the ruling on law made by the
superior court could lead it to give a judgment contrary to
Community law-to decide to refer to the Court questions on
which there is doubt.
2. Review by the Court of Justice
Review by the Court depends upon the principles just
stated. The national court bears the responsibility for the
eventual judgment in the case and must decide, considering
the facts of the case, whether or not it is necessary to obtain a
preliminary ruling. However, there are inherent limits to the
national court's power of appraisal that arise from the nature
of the preliminary reference procedure itself, the observance
of which is subject to review by the Court. It must be borne in
mind that in proceedings under Article 177, the Court may
rule only on questions of Community law, and that a prelimi-
nary ruling can only be requested by a court in the course of
judicial proceedings. The Court has inferred from those prin-
ciples that a reference for a preliminary ruling is only admissi-
ble if it concerns a question of Community law of the kind re-
ferred to in Article 177 which has arisen in the course of a gen-
uine legal dispute. If one of those conditions is not met the
Court has repeatedly held that it has no jurisdiction to enter-
tain the question referred. This was the case, for example,
with a question regarding the treatment under French social
welfare law of a payment made under the German Bundesent-
57. Rheinmiuhlen Diisseldorfv. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fir Getreide und Fut-
termittel, Case 166/73, 1974 E.C.R. 33, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8265;
Rheinmhfilen - Disseldorf v. Einfuhr - und Vorratsstelle ftir Getreide und Futtermit-
tel, Case 146/73, 1974 E.C.R. 139, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8266.
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schidigungsgesetz.58
The same line of reasoning was subsequently followed in
two decisions on references for preliminary rulings by the act-
ing judge at the Tribunal d'Instance of Hayange. In the first
case, the judge asked the following question: "What protec-
tion does the Treaty afford with regard to observance of the
fundamental principle of the independence of the judiciary in
the application of the law? ' 59 The main proceedings con-
cerned a legal dispute which had arisen out of a traffic accident
in France in which only French nationals were involved. In the
second case, an action for the eviction of tenants, the judge
asked whether an action against him for damages for a denial
of justice was compatible with "the requirements inherent in
the very nature of Community law applicable to this case. ' 60
In both cases, the Court held that it clearly had no jurisdiction
to reply to the questions referred, since it was apparent from
the grounds and wording of the decisions making the refer-
ences that the questions did "not in any way relate either to the
interpretation of the EEC Treaty or to the validity or interpre-
tation of an act of a Community institution. '"61
The judgment in Mattheus v. Doego 62 follows the same ap-
proach. In that case the Amtsgericht in Essen had referred a
number of questions on the interpretation of Article 237 of the
EEC Treaty (admission of new Member States to the Commu-
nity). In essence, it asked whether or not there were reasons
based on Community law making the accession of Spain, Por-
tugal, and Greece (1978) impossible in the foreseeable future.
The Court declined jurisdiction on the ground that the legal
conditions of such accession must first be delineated in the
context of a well-defined procedure, that is, in political negoti-
58. Jacob Adlerblum v. Caisse Nationale d'Assurance Vieillesse des Travailleurs
Salari6s, Case 93/75, 1975 E.C.R. 2147, paras. 1-4, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) -
(federal law on compensation for victims of Nazi persecution).
59. Preliminary ruling by the ActingJudge at the Tribunal d'Instance, Hayange,
Case 105/79, 1979 E.C.R. 2257, 2257, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) -.
60. Reference for a Preliminary ruling by the Acting Judge at the Tribunal
d'Instance, Hayange, Case 68/80, 1980 E.C.R. 771, 771, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
61. Order of the Court 27 June 1979, Case 105/79, 1979 E.C.R. 2257, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) -; Order of the Court 12 March 1980, Case 68/80, 1980 E.C.R.
771, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) -.
62. Lothar Mattheus v. Doego Fruchtimport und Tufkiihlkost eG, Case 93/78,
1978 E.C.R. 2203, paras. 4-7, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8517.
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ations, so that it was not possible to determine their content
judicially in advance.63 The reasoning of the Court in that case
(which shows careful adherence to the "political question doc-
trine") may lie in the fact that Article 237 does not normally
have consequences for a private contract and the parties can-
not create such consequences by agreement. The parties to
the action before the national court should not be able to com-
pel the Court to make a highly political statement regarding
the fundamental organization of the Community unless it is
necessary.
The Court also pays strict attention to the question of
whether or not its answer will serve to resolve a genuine dis-
pute. It considers in that regard that the duty assigned to it by
Article 177 is not that of delivering purely advisory opinions
on general or hypothetical questions.64 The Court should not
be confused with a legal adviser who may be asked at will for
legal information. That concept was emphasized in the two Fo-
glia v. Novello cases, in which an Italian court, the Pretura di
Bra, referred to the Court a number of questions regarding the
compatibility with Community law of a French tax. The Court
held that the questions referred did not fall within the frame-
work of the duties of the Court under Article 177 and there-
fore declined jurisdiction.65
The key reason for judgment was the finding that the ac-
tion involved a fictitious dispute or an artificial device contrary
to the normal division ofjurisdiction between the courts of the
various Member States and between those courts and the
Court ofJustice.66 In the Court's view, the parties agreed as to
the result sought, and they intended, by means of a contract
governed by private law, to induce the Court to give a judg-
ment that was not in fact necessary and to evade the jurisdic-
tion of the French courts. It appears from the facts of the case
that in their submissions to the Court, both parties to the main
proceedings described the alleged discrimination inFrench tax
63. Id. at 2211, para. 7.
64. Foglia v. Novello H, Case 244/80, 1981 E.C.R. at 3045, para. 18; see supra note
13.
65. Pasquale Foglia v. Mariella Novello, Case 104/79, 1980 E.C.R. 745, paras.
1 1-12, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8659 (Foglia v. Novello I); Foglia v. Novello H, Case
244/80, 1981 E.C.R. 3045, paras. 32-34, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8786.
66. Foglia v. Novello H, 1981 E.C.R. at 3061, para. 13.
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law in substantially the same terms and agreed that the tax reg-
ulation in question should be ruled contrary to Community
law:
It must in fact be emphasized that the duty assigned to
the Court by Article 177 is not that of delivering advisory
opinions on general or hypothetical questions but of assist-
ing in the administration ofjustice in the Member States. It
accordingly does not have jurisdiction to reply to questions
of interpretation which are submitted to it within the frame-
work of procedural devices arranged by the parties in order
to induce the Court to give its views on certain problems of
Community law which do not correspond to an objective
requirement inherent in the resolution of a dispute. A dec-
laration by the Court that it has no jurisdiction in such cir-
cumstances does not in any way trespass upon the preroga-
tives of the national court but makes it possible to prevent
the application of the procedure under Article 177 for pur-
poses other than those appropriate for it.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that, whilst the
Court of Justice must be able to place as much reliance as
possible upon the assessment by the national court of the
extent to which the questions submitted are essential, it
must be in a position to make any assessment inherent in
the performance of its own duties in particular in order to
check, as all courts must, whether it has jurisdiction.67
These judgments caused something of a sensation in legal
circles. Although they may seem revolutionary at first glance,
however, their practical effect should not be overestimated.
They concerned a case of a rare and exceptional nature. The
Court was opposed above all to manipulation of the procedure
by the parties contrary to the spirit and intent of the judicial
cooperation provided for by the Treaty. Such manipulations
must not be permitted to turn the preliminary reference proce-
dure into a surreptitious infringement procedure. It would
certainly be wrong, therefore, to see in these judgments a ten-
dency on the part of the Court to place restrictions on the ref-
erence procedures, or a new departure in its jurisprudence.
Indeed, the "fictitious dispute" argument has been made in
subsequent proceedings, but the Court has never again ap-
67. Id. at 3062-63, paras. 18-19.
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plied the principle developed in Foglia v. Novello. 68 However,
in borderline cases, national courts would be well advised,
when making a reference for a preliminary ruling, to add a
statement of the reasons which have led them in that particular
case to refer a question whose scope seems to go beyond the
legal issue necessary for the decision of the case.
Apart from the cases discussed in which the reference for
a preliminary ruling clearly did not concern Community law or
did not arise out of a genuine dispute, the Court has declined
to entertain references only in cases where the reference to the
provision of Community law in question was clearly incor-
rect, 69 and the real subject matter of the reference could not be
ascertained from the reasons stated in the decision making the
reference or from the documents before the Court. In such a
case it would be sheer formalism to provide an answer to the
question referred. It would not help the national court in mak-
ing its decision. In such cases, the Court has not declined ju-
risdiction but has limited itself to stating that in light of the
factual and legal circumstances of the main proceedings "no
reply need be given to the question referred by the national
court,""v or that "it is unnecessary for the Court to give a rul-
ing. ' 7 1
Such a practice is not of course intended to impinge upon
the jurisdiction of the national court. Rather, it should be un-
derstood as a manifestation of the cooperative nature of the
preliminary reference procedure-cooperation that would be
entirely lacking if a ruling were made which clearly would not
assist the national court in reaching a decision.
68. Michele Bestini v. Regione Lazio, Cases 98/162 and 258/85, 1986 E.C.R. -
(paras. 5-8 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 43,338; SpA Vinal v. SpA
Orbat, Case 46/80, 1981 E.C.R. 77, 91, para. 5, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8724;
Chemial Farmaceutici SpA v. DAF SpA, Case 140/79, 1981 E.C.R. 1, 13, para. 7,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8723.
69. Cf Thomasdunger v. Oberfinanzdirektion Frankfurt am Main, Case 166/84,
1985 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) -; SpA Salgoil v. Italian Ministry for
Foreign Trade, Case 13/68, 1968 E.C.R. 453, 459-60, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8072.
70. Rijksdienst voor Werknemerspensioenen v. Alice Vlaeminck, Case 132/81,
1982 E.C.R. 2953, 2964, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) -.
71. Celestri & Co. SpA v. Ministry of France, Case 172/84, 1985 E.C.R. - (para.
17 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) -; cf. C. WRIGHT, supra note 16,
§§ 52-52A, at 302-30 (discussion of abstention doctrines).
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B. The Duty of Courts of Last Instance to Make References
The only courts that are obliged to refer questions are
those against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy
under national law, that is, courts of last instance.72 Other
courts are simply entitled to make references. The Treaty
merely ensures that they have the assistance of the Court of
Justice when for reasons of expediency they wish it to clarify a
preliminary question of Community law. The question of
whether or not a court decides at last instance is thus the crite-
rion that determines whether or not a court entitled to make
references is obliged to do so under the third paragraph of Ar-
ticle 177.
1. The Meaning of the Term "Court of Last Instance"
In academic circles there is some controversy over
whether the term "court of last instance" is to be understood
in a concrete (functional) or abstract (institutional) sense. Ac-
cording to the abstract (institutional) approach, only the high-
est courts in the judicial hierarchy are obliged to make refer-
ences. 73 According to the concrete (functional) approach, on
the other hand, the duty to make a reference is determined by
the nature of the proceedings in the particular case. It relates
not to the position of the relevant court in the judicial hierar-
chy but rather to the nature of the decision to be made. Along
72. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177, para. 3 (courts of last instance are those
after which there is no judicial remedy).
73. The following courts may be regarded as hierarchically highest in the Euro-
pean Community Member States (except Spain and Portugal):
Belgium: Cour de Cassation; Conseil d'Etat.
Denmark: Hojesteret.
Federal Republic of Germany: Bundesverfassungsgericht; Bundesgerichshof;
Bundesverwaltungsgericht; Bundesarbeitsgericht; Bundesfinanzhof;
Bundessozialgericht.
Greece: Asrios Pagos (Court of Cassation); Symboulio Epikratias (Council
of State); Anotato Idiko Dikastrio (Supreme Special Court).
France: Cour de Cassation; Conseil d'Etat.
Ireland: Supreme Court.
Italy: Corte Costituzionale; Corte Suprema di Cassazione; Consiglio di
Stato.
Luxembourg: Cour de Cassation; Conseil d'Etat.
Netherlands: Hoge Raad; Raad van State; Centrale Raad van Beroep; Col-
lege van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven; Tariefcommissie.
United Kingdom: House of Lords; Privy Council.
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with the courts "at the top of the judicial pyramid" it is argued
that Article 177 applies to courts "which must from time to
time give final decisions, but only in such cases,"' 74 that is,
where because of the nature of the dispute of which it is seised
(for example, the amount at issue) there is no appeal from its
decision. That can in practice give rise to problems of delimi-
tation, for example, where it is not clear from the outset
whether or not it will be possible to appeal from the decision
to be given (e.g., where a specific sum must be attained before
an appeal is possible, or where leave to appeal must be ob-
tained from that court itself or from the appeal court).
The concrete theory has in its favor the fact that it ensures
that individual rights are protected at all levels of the judicial
hierarchy. The danger of divergent interpretations really
arises only at the level of the courts of last instance. Such
courts make decisions that cannot subsequently be modified.
Only then can the incorrect interpretation and application of
Community law have definitive harmful consequences for the
individual. In contrast, in earlier stages of the proceedings,
any errors on the part of the lower court may be raised in an
appeal under national law and corrected by the superior
courts.
The advantage of the abstract theory, on the other hand, is
that it prevents the Court from being overloaded with pro-
ceedings of minor importance. It is oriented less to the protec-
tion of legal rights than to the necessity of protecting the integ-
rity of the legal system. The decisions of the highest courts
clearly have a far-reaching effect as precedents. They influence
trends in the lower courts and thus constitute the "hard core"
of national case law.75 Discrepancies, differences of opinion,
and the resulting legal uncertainty at that level seriously en-
danger the unity and existence of the Community legal order.
The Court of Justice has not yet clearly decided the issue,
but seems inclined toward the concrete approach. Indications
of that may be found in particular in the Court's judgment in
Costa v. ENEL on a reference from the Giudice Conciliatore,
74. G. VANDERSANDEN & A. BARAV, CONTENTIEUX COMMUNAUTAIRE 281 (1977).
75. Srl C.I.L.F.I.T. & Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, Case
283/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, 3432, 3440, para. 8, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8875
(opinion of Advocate General Capotorti).
ARTICLE 177 EEC TREATY
Milan.76
2. The Scope of the Duty to Make References
The scope of the duty of courts of last instance to make
references has been the object of doctrinal debate since the
Community's inception. Academic opinion is virtually unani-
mous in holding that there is no duty to make a reference when
there can be no reasonable doubt as to the validity or interpre-
tation of the relevant Community law. That conclusion finds
some support in the wording of the second paragraph of Arti-
cle 177, according to which the courts of the Member States
may only refer questions to the Court if they consider that the
Court's ruling "is necessary."
To support their position, commentators generally refer
to the acte clair doctrine, derived from the French legal system.
Concern for the orderly administration of justice requires that
the courts refuse to permit dilatory tactics that would unneces-
sarily prolong the proceedings. It is argued, therefore, that a
reference for a preliminary ruling should be considered only if
there is real difficulty in ascertaining the content and scope of
Community law.
The acte clair doctrine arose in France in connection with
the principle of separation of powers between the executive
and the judiciary in the interpretation and application of inter-
national treaties. The interpretation of such treaties is re-
served to the executive, because it bears the responsibility at
the international level. The courts may only apply them. If
interpretation is necessary, courts must ask the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs for an official and authoritative clarification of the
76. Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. 585, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8023. The Court of Justice has held on more than one occasion that the
duty of courts of last instance to make references arises only in substantive proceed-
ings and not in proceedings for interim measures or interlocutory injunctions; in
such cases the parties remain at liberty to make the appropriate submissions in the
main proceedings. The requirements arising from the purpose of Article 177 are
observed as regards summary proceedings where "ordinary proceedings as to the
substance, permitting the re-examination of any question of Community law provi-
sionally decided in the summary proceedings, must be instituted either in all circum-
stances or when the unsuccessful party so requires." Hoffmann-La Roche v. Cen-
trafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, Case 107/76,
1977 E.C.R. 957, para. 5, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8414; Elestina Christina Mor-
son v. State of the Netherlands & Head of the Plaatselijke Politie, Joined Cases 35 &
36/82, 1982 E.C.R. 3723, para. 8, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8876.
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provisions of the treaty in question. To restrict the role of the
executive and limit its influence on their judgments, the courts
developed the acte clair doctrine, thus retaining the power to
determine whether or not genuine difficulties of interpretation
exist and recovering a broad margin of discretion.7 7
In the 1960s, the French Conseil d'Etat and-to a lesser
extent-the Cour de Cassation used the acte clair doctrine to
curtail the scope of their obligation to make references under
the third paragraph of Article 177. That enabled them to sub-
stitute their own interpretation of Community law for the in-
terpretation of the Court.78
As a result, the highest courts of a number of other Mem-
ber States rallied to the acte clair doctrine. In one case the Ger-
man Bundesverwaltungsgericht refused to refer a question to
the Court on the ground that the material provision of Com-
munity law was not in question. There was no room for inter-
pretation, the German court reasoned, "since this provision
does not need interpretation.,
79
Commentators on European law, however, have largely
rejected the acte clair doctrine. It is generally recognized that
the duty to make a reference does not extend to questions to
which an impartial lawyer could reasonably give only one an-
swer. It is objected, however, that the overly hasty acceptance
of such a practice would inevitably weaken the duty to make
references and thus undermine the preliminary reference pro-
cedure. A matter cannot be assumed to be "clear" simply be-
cause the national court believes that it can be subjectively cer-
tain of the content of the relevant Community law, but only
where, objectively speaking, there is no doubt at all as to the
validity and meaning of the rule of law in question. Although
the right to make references depends on the subjective opinion
of the national court, attention must still be focused on the
objective circumstances. Otherwise, the scope of the duty to
77. C.LL.F.LT., Case 283/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3432, 3435, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8875 (opinion of Advocate General Capotorti).
78. Conseil d'Etat: SHELL BERRE 344 (1964); SYNDICAT NATIONAL DES IM-
PORTATEURS FRANOAIS EN PRODITS LAITIERS 41 (1967); SYNDICAT DES IMPORTATEURS
DE VETEMENTS ET PRODUITS ARTISANAUX 209 (1979) (Jurisprudence); Cour de Cassa-
tion: LAPEYRE 465 (1967) (Jurisprudence); Pieron & Dufour, BULLETIN DES ARRETS
DE LA COUR DE CASSATION 692 (Chambre Criminelle, 1973); see also L.-J. CONSTAN-
TINESCO, DAS RECHT DER EUROPXISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN 831 (1977).
79. Judgment of 14 Feb. 1969, 31 Entsch. BverwG. 279, 284.
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make references would depend on a national court's self-confi-
dence and its readiness to make decisions. This might foster
the manipulation of the duty to make references by courts ac-
customed to making decisions independently, thus frustrating
the objective of that duty: the preservation of the unity of
Community law.
In its Da Costa judgment, the Court expressed the view
that the duty to make references under paragraph 3 of Article
177 is in principle unrestricted and admits of exception only
where in a particular case the authority of a ruling already
given by the Court in a similar case may "deprive the obliga-
tion of its purpose and thus empty it of its substance."8 0
That point of view was further developed and qualified in
the C.LL.F.I.T. judgment.8I The main point of the question
referred was whether and to what extent the existence of an
obligation to make a reference under paragraph 3 of Article
177 depended "on the prior finding of a reasonable interpreta-
tive doubt."'8 2 In its ruling the Court at last defined the scope
and limits of the duty of courts of last instance to make refer-
ences both generally and in the context of the case, and in do-
ing so laid down the following main criteria: (i) Article 177 of
the Treaty does not constitute a means of redress available to
the parties to the proceedings before a national court. There-
fore, the mere fact that a party contends that the dispute gives
rise to a question concerning the interpretation of Community
law does not mean that a national court is obliged to make a
reference. Where necessary, however, it may refer a matter to
the Court of Justice on its own motion. (ii) Because the ques-
tion of the necessity of the reference is a matter for the juris-
diction of a national court, it is not obliged to make a reference
if the question raised is not relevant, that is, if the answer to
that question can in no way affect the outcome of the case. Nor
is a national court obliged to make a reference where previous
decisions of the Court of Justice have already dealt with the
point of law in question, irrespective of the nature of the pro-
ceedings which led to those decisions, even though the ques-
80. Da Costa, Joined Cases 28-30/62, 1963 E.C.R. 31, 38, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8010, at 7239.
81. C.LL.F.LT., Case 283/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3432, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8875.
82. Id. at 3432, para. 1.
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tions at issue are not strictly identical to those already re-
solved. (iii) Finally, there is no obligation to make a refer-
ence when "the correct application of Community Law [is] so
obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the
manner in which the question raised is to be resolved." That
statement is, however, restricted by the necessity of ensuring
that the threshold of reasonable doubt is defined according to
objective criteria, and that the specific difficulties of interpret-
ing Community law (legislation drafted in several languages,
new terminology, determination of context) are borne in mind.
The central test is whether or not there is a risk that a court in
another Member State or the Court ofJustice may give a differ-
ent decision.85
V. THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF PRELIMINARY RULINGS
The preliminary ruling takes the form of a judgment,
which in its form and content reflects the nonadversarial na-
ture of the preliminary reference procedure. The fact that the
dispute of which the national court is seisecl merely defines the
factual context in regard to which the Court makes an abstract
statement of the law. The judgment contains the answer to the
question referred, that is, a statement regarding the validity or
interpretation of the rule of Community law in question.
A. Effects in the Main Proceedings
The preliminary ruling is clearly binding in its effect on
the proceedings that prompted the national court to make the
reference. It is binding not only on the court making the refer-
ence but also on any other court in the Member State con-
cerned which is called upon to make a decision in the same
case. It is therefore binding on the appellate court, when the
reference for a preliminary ruling was made by a lower court in
the exercise of its right under the second paragraph of Article
177. It may also be binding on a lower court to which the case
is remitted for judgment by the appellate court, irrespective of
whether the reference was made by the appellate court itself or
by the lower court against whose decision an appeal was
brought.
83. Case 283/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, 3428-30, paras. 5-16, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8875.
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The fact that the preliminary ruling is binding in the main
proceedings means that the competent national courts must
decide the dispute of which they are seised on the basis of the
interpretation given by the Court ofJustice. They may not de-
part from the Court's ruling. In short, they must apply the rule
of Community law in question as interpreted by the Court, or
must refrain from applying a rule of law held invalid. That
does not mean, however, that the competent national courts
are obliged to apply the Community rule in question as inter-
preted by the Court where they subsequently come to the con-
clusion (perhaps on the basis of the answer given by the Court
itself) that the rule of law in question is not relevant to the case
before them. Under the division of competence in the prelim-
inary reference procedure, such questions of relevance fall
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national court.
In practice, problems can arise over the question whether
the Court's ruling on a matter of Community law is also appli-
cable to circumstances that arose prior to the date of the pre-
liminary ruling. Generally, a preliminary ruling has effect ex
tunc. However, for reasons of legal certainty, the Court has in
exceptional cases held that its ruling should have effect ex nunc,
both in cases of invalidity and (contrary to previous practice)
with regard to the interpretation of Community regulations.
The limitation of the temporal validity of a ruling is only
possible in the actual judgment giving the ruling. The funda-
mental need for a general and uniform application of Commu-
nity law implies that it is for the Court alone to decide whether
the interpretation which it lays down should be limited in
time.84
Only in rare cases has the Court limited the application of
preliminary rulings temporally. On each occasion the ruling
concerned a regulation with important financial implications.
The retroactive application of the ruling would in a multitude
of individual cases have given rise to claims for the repayment
of sums improperly charged and for the payment of sums un-
paid. It also would have required the re-settlement of a great
number of public law and private law transactions, some of
84. Amministrazione delle Finanze v. S.r.l. Meridionale Industria Salumi,
Fratelli Vasanelli & Fratelli Ultrocchi, Joined Cases 66, 127 & 128/79, 1980 E.C.R.
1237, 1261, para. 11, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8663.
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them going far into the past. That would have had unjustifi-
able economic consequences for the economic operators con-
cerned, and would have endangered the smooth functioning of
the Common Market.
In Defrenne v. Sabena,15 in which a ruling that the principle
of equal pay for men and women (Article 119 of the EEC
Treaty) had direct effect was held inapplicable to past circum-
stances, the Court justified the limitation of the temporal effect
of its judgment:
As the general level at which pay would have been fixed can-
not be known, important considerations of legal certainty
affecting all the interests involved, both public and private,
make it impossible in principle to re-open the question as
regards the past. Therefore, the direct effect of Article 119
cannot be relied on in order to support claims concerning
pay periods prior to the date of this judgment, except as
regards those workers who have already brought legal pro-
ceedings or made an equivalent claim.8 6
In Defrenne, the Court made an exception to the general denial
of retroactive effect in favor of the plaintiff in the main pro-
ceedings. That aspect of the judgment has not, however, been
consistently followed. In a number of more recent decisions,
the Court has held instead that its ruling that certain provi-
sions of Community law (regarding the fixing of monetary
compensatory amounts) were invalid should have no retroac-
tive effect whatsoever, even with regard to the parties to the
main proceedings.8
B. Effect as Precedents
The generally accepted view is that a preliminary ruling is
directly binding only with regard to the proceedings in which
85. Gabrielle Defrenne v. Soci6t6 Anonyme Beige de Navigation Arienne
Sabena, Case 43/75, 1976 E.C.R. 455, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8346.
86. Id. at 481, para. 75.
87. "Soci~t6 Cooperative" Providence Agricole de la Champagne v. Office Na-
tional Interprofessionnel des C&ales (ONIC), Case 4/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2823, 2853,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8716; Sirl Maiseries de Beauce v. Office National Inter-
professionnel des CUrales (ONIC), Case 109/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2883, 2913, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8717; SA Roquette Fr~res v. French State - Customs Administra-
tion, Case 145/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2917, 2946, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8718. For
the most recent case law on that position, see Pietro Pinna v. Caisse d'Allocations
Familiales de la Savoie, Case 41/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) -.
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the reference was made. That does not, however, preclude the
possibility that recourse may be had to the solution set out in
one preliminary ruling in other proceedings dealing with the
same or similar questions of Community law. The preliminary
ruling can then be said to function as a model or precedent.
That concept found expression as early as 1963 in the Da
Costa case,8 s in which the Court of Justice simply referred the
national court to the answer which it had given two months
before in the Van Gend & Loos judgment,8 9 because there were
no new facts which might affect its decision.
Some commentators criticized this course of action, ob-
jecting that the Court of Justice should have repeated the an-
swer it had given in the Van Gend & Loos judgment. Indeed,
further examination of the case would have induced many
other courts to refer the same question. Courts of last in-
stance, obliged to refer questions under the third paragraph of
Article 177, would certainly have considered it a formalistic
and pettifogging attitude. To refer a question that has already
been decided simply prolongs the proceedings unnecessarily
and multiplies the costs. Finally, renewed consideration of the
circumstances would have prejudiced the Court's role as the
authoritative interpreter of Community law. At the same time,
the Da Costa judgment does include an important clarification:
nothing prevents national courts from referring for a second
time questions of interpretation which have already been decided
in a similar case.90
The Court reserves the right to depart from its previous
judgments in appropriate circumstances. This accords not
only with the dynamic nature of Community law, which implies
that the Court cannot consider itself bound by its own judg-
ments, but also with the cooperative function of the procedure,
which requires that national courts always be able to refer to
the Court new elements of fact or law. On the other hand, the
principles of legal certainty and the uniformity of Community
88. Da Costa, Joined Cases 28-30/62, 1963 E.C.R. 31, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8010.
89. N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos &
Nederlandse administratie der belastingen (Netherlands Inland Revenue Administra-
tion), Case 26/62, 1963 E.C.R. 1, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8008.
90. 1963 E.C.R. at 31. "Article 177 always allows a national court, if it considers
it desirable, to refer questions of interpretation to the Court again." Id.
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Law require that the courts of the Member States, including
those which are not obliged to make references under the third
paragraph of Article 177, not independently depart from an
earlier decision of the Court but make a new reference if they
wish to base their decision on a different view of the law.
The value of preliminary rulings as precedents may thus
be compared with the effect of decisions of the highest courts
in national law. Aside from the special case of Anglo-American
common law and the normative effect of certain judgments of
constitutional courts, even leading decisions of the highest na-
tional courts are not directly binding outside the context of the
dispute which gave rise to them. They are, however, a de facto
source of law, since in practice their impact necessarily goes far
beyond the specific case in hand.
The same is true of preliminary rulings made in proceed-
ings to ascertain the validity of Community legal measures. It
is clear from the difference in terminology between the term
"void" used in connection with direct actions under Article
174 of the EEC Treaty and the term "validity" used in Article
177, that a declaration of validity or invalidity in the context of
a preliminary ruling has no directly binding effect erga omnes.
This is confirmed by the differing objectives of the action for
nullity and the preliminary reference on questions of validity.
The limited legal effect of preliminary rulings declaring
contested Community regulations valid may be seen in the
careful wording of such decisions. The judgment is usually
worded as follows: "Consideration of the question raised has
disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of
Article... of Regulation (Directive, etc.) . . . ." In other words,
in preliminary rulings the Court does not claim to have ex-
amined all possible objections that might be raised to the va-
lidity of the provision or measure in question. As a rule, it lim-
its itself to consideration of the arguments made before it and
of certain points that it must take into account ex officio. A
decision of this kind does not preclude the possibility that the
provision or measure in question may be invalid for reasons
other than those already examined.
In theory the position is the same when a Community
measure is declared invalid. In principle there is no reason
why the Court should not reverse its previous decisions. It
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would be difficult, however, to reconcile such a course of ac-
tion with the principle of protection of legitimate expectations.
From a practical point of view, it is therefore inconceivable that
the Court, having once held a rule of law invalid, would subse-
quently declare it valid after further consideration.
A declaration that a rule of Community law is invalid must
therefore be followed by all national courts, even though the
judgment in question is not directly binding on them. Natu-
rally, a new reference may also be made in such a case. For
reasons of procedural economy, however, such action should
be considered only in exceptional cases, for instance, when fur-
ther information is desired regarding the reasons for the decla-
ration of invalidity, its scope or its legal effects.
CONCLUSION
The essence of the preliminary ruling procedure lies in the
spirit of mutual trust and cooperation which exists between the
national courts and the Court of Justice. It is reflected in the
frank and vigorous dialogue that takes place between the
Court and the national courts, in the appreciation that both
sides show for each other's problems and difficulties, and in
their respect for the different jurisdictions. In that connection,
the role of the national courts cannot be overemphasized. The
effectiveness of the procedure and thus the permanent uni-
formity and coherence of the Community legal order depends
on the responsible collaboration of the national courts.
Of course, conflicts regarding jurisdiction and disagree-
ments cannot always be avoided. They are not peculiar to the
procedure, however. Such disagreements also arise within na-
tional legal orders, particularly when several judicial branches
co-exist independently. Any differences of opinion between
the Court and the national courts are all the more understand-
able because Community law has developed concepts which do
not exist in all the legal orders of the Member States or at least
are not given the same meaning and weight. Some examples
of this are the general principles of Community law that the
Court has developed, such as the principles of the protection
of legitimate expectations, of legal certainty and of proportion-
ality, or certain aspects of the jurisprudence on civil rights
("fundamental rights") in the context of the Community.
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Although those concepts are also recognized in one form or
another as a component of the democratic and legal society
existing in all the Member States, there are often significant
differences in the scope and weight attached to them in the
individual national legal orders. In particular, supreme courts
that work on the basis of settled legal traditions and principles
need time to adjust to the new methods which they are re-
quired to adopt in dealing with Community law.
The Court is still occasionally seen as a body that threat-
ens the jurisdiction of the national courts and not as one that
provides support and assistance in the fulfillment of their du-
ties. This is seen in national courts' reliance on the acte clair
doctrine, in the form that questions take, and in the length of
the procedure.
Courts of last instance, deliberately or unconsciously,
shelter behind the useful acte clair doctrine to evade their duty
to make references to the Court. Other courts justify their in-
clination to decide cases on their own by citing the optional
nature of references in relation to proceedings pending before
them. In addition, the tendency of many courts to avoid,
where possible, a procedure in which they do not have suffi-
cient confidence, is often encouraged by the attitude of the
parties to the proceedings. For these parties, the intermediate
procedure before the Court represents an unnecessary prolon-
gation of the proceedings or an additional element of uncer-
tainty. These parties often rely on Community law without giv-
ing proper thought to the matter and without providing the
national court with a sound basis for its decision.
Misunderstandings and therefore conflicts can also arise
from the inadequate formulation of the questions submitted to
the Court. These questions either do not respect the limits
placed on the Court's jurisdiction in preliminary ruling pro-
ceedings or do not bring out the true legal problem arising
from the case sufficiently clearly. Thus the Court is repeatedly
faced with questions from courts with insufficient knowledge of
Community law which, because they are formulated in terms
which are too specific, fall under the sphere of the application,
rather than that the interpretation, of Community law. On the
other hand, the courts occasionally strive so hard to be abstract
that in the absence of sufficiently clear references to the facts in
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the main proceedings, the question is incomprehensible, and it
is impossible to give a reply that may help to settle the dispute.
The length of the procedure obstructs fruitful cooperation
between the national courts and the Court of Justice.
Although the average length of the preliminary ruling proce-
dure-approximately one year from the registration of the re-
quest for a preliminary ruling and the judgment-is clearly
shorter than the periods required by national supreme courts
in appeal or cassation proceedings, it can, particularly in con-
nection with small cases, deter a court that is in principle will-
ing to make a reference.
The Court has made every effort with all the means at its
disposal to keep the length of the procedure as short as possi-
ble. A frequent source of delay, the notorious overburdening
of the full Court, was removed at least in part by the amend-
ment to the Rules of Procedure in 1979. That amendment
provided for easier assignment of cases to Chambers.9" There
are, however, certain technical obstacles to introducing further
measures to reduce the length of the procedure. Because the
main working language and the language of deliberation of the
Court is traditionally French, if necessary all the relevant docu-
ments must be translated into that language, irrespective of the
language of the case. Additionally, it does not appear possible
to reduce the two-month period for the submission of written
observations 92 in view of the fact that the parties often submit
very extensive observations. Finally, the complex administra-
tive apparatus of the Member States and the Community insti-
tutions requires a certain amount of time to reach the political
decision of principle on which their observations are based.
91. Rules of Procedure, art. 95, O.J. 1979, No. L 238/1, 3-4, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 4845.
92. Protocol on the Statute of the Court ofJustice of the EEC, art. 20, reprinted in
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4731.
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